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Abstract Spatially explicit data pose a series of opportunities and challenges for
all the actors involved in providing data for long-term preservation and secondary
analysis—the data producer, the data archive, and the data user. We report on
opportunities and challenges for each of the three players, and then turn to a
summary of current thinking about how best to prepare, archive, disseminate, and
make use of social science data that have spatially explicit identification. The core
issue that runs through the paper is the risk of the disclosure of the identity of
respondents. If we know where they live, where they work, or where they own
property, it is possible to find out who they are. Those involved in collecting,
archiving, and using data need to be aware of the risks of disclosure and become
familiar with best practices to avoid disclosures that will be harmful to respondents.
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This paper is about the challenges involved in producing, archiving, and sharing
social science data that have spatially explicit information embedded within them,
all while avoiding the risk of disclosing private information about the individuals
who have consented to share information about themselves, in the case of survey
research, or who are part of the universe of individuals included in an administrative
record system or database. It takes as its starting point the perspective of the data
archivist, but it tries to maintain a clear understanding of the competing interests of
the data producer, the data user, the survey respondent, and the manager of the data
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repository, not to mention whatever organization has provided the resources
required to collect, clean, document, and disseminate the data. Like others who are
concerned about protecting the confidentiality of survey respondents, we are acutely
aware that the wealth of information publicly available today increases the risk that
someone will breach the promise of confidentiality that is made when most social
science data are collected. Spatially explicit data, because they are by definition
linked to a specific location that might be someone’s home or another easily
identifiable place, have the potential to aggravate that risk. Our goal here is to
describe many of the issues, identify some of the ways that confidentiality can be
protected, and then draw conclusions about current best practices.
Our work arises out of ICPSR’s commitment to disclosure analysis and
reduction, and an ongoing program of work designed to ensure that the data we
archive and disseminate is as safe as possible from disclosure risk (O’Rourke et al.
2006; O’Rourke 2003; Dunn and Austin 1998). This work has led to our
involvement in a group of projects at the University of Michigan’s Institute for
Social Research, designed to help learn more about the risk of disclosure in social
survey data, the attitudes that survey respondents have about the risk of
confidentiality breach, and current practices within the research community
designed to protect survey respondents, and then to ensure that the information
we gather is disseminated widely to the research community.1
Before we flesh out our discussion, we begin with a simple definition of
disclosure as it is associated with social science research data.
For our purposes, we define Disclosure as:
the breach of confidentiality that allows an outsider, whom we call the
‘‘intruder,’’ to discern the identity of an individual or business respondent or to
associate the individual or business’s identity with characteristics reported in a
survey or administrative database under a pledge of confidentiality.2
Going further, we can define two elements, attribute disclosure and identity
disclosure (Duncan and Lambert 1989; Lambert 1993). Attribute disclosure takes as
its basic premise that an individual is a respondent in a survey or a subject in an
administrative database, and that the intruder knows that the individual is represented
in the database. In this case the intruder knows the identity of the respondent but
wishes to know specific responses or attributes of that person as recorded in the
1 Myron Gutmann is principal investigator of NICHD Program Project P01-HD045753, ‘‘Human Subject
Protection and Disclosure Risk Analysis.’’ The projects are ‘‘Informed Consent and Perceptions of Risk and
Harm in Survey Participation,’’ directed by Eleanor Singer, Fred Conrad, and Robert Groves, ‘‘Estimation of
Disclosure Risk and Statistical Methods for Disclosure Limitation,’’ directed by T.E. Raghunathan,
Roderick Little, and Richard Valliant, ‘‘Disclosure Control: Best Practices & Tools for the Social Sciences,’’
directed by JoAnne M. O’Rourke, and ‘‘Resources for the Secure Dissemination of Human Subjects Data,’’
directed by James McNally and Myron Gutmann. The project has a web site at http://www.icpsr.umich.
edu/HSP/. We have contributed to related work published as VanWey et al. (2005) and National Research
Council (2007), both of which benefited from the fundamental work reported in this paper.
2 This statement is the authors’ working definition, not intentionally a quotation from another source. We
believe that the term ‘‘intruder’’ has its origins in the work of Duncan and Lambert (1989). Within the
Disclosure literature, data users who attempt to identify anonymized records are called ‘‘Intruders’’ (Elliot
2001) or ‘‘Statistical Spies’’ (Roberts 1986).
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database. The intruder attempts to figure out which set of characteristics in the
database belongs to the known subject, so that she or he can learn that person’s
characteristics or attributes. One classic example is that a parent knows that his or her
child participated in a school-based survey, but wishes to know the child’s response
to certain questions, for example about sexual activity or experience with drugs.
Identity disclosure takes as its basic premise that the intruder does not know that any
given individual is a respondent in a survey, but wishes to learn the identity of survey
respondents in order to know something about them, to make contact with them, or to
harm them or the survey sponsor in some way. Here an example is a marketing firm
with a consumer database that it wishes to enrich by identifying and linking
information from a large national survey. It would then use its enriched data base to
communicate with or sell to those individuals. Another, more pernicious, example
would be for the intruder to attempt to identify individuals in a survey merely for the
purpose of making their responses known to the general public.
Still more serious, identity disclosure from survey or administrative data might
be used by private or public groups to target or harm individuals, population
subgroups, or business enterprises. While there are relatively few cases of
confidentiality breach by individuals, researchers have found all too many examples
of this last form of disclosure risk, whereby groups are identified and harmed using
data from official statistics, if not from academic survey research activities (Seltzer
and Anderson 2001, 2005, 2007; Anderson and Seltzer 2007). Most analyses of
disclosure risk focus on the possibility that an individual may be identified and
harmed based on analysis of individual micro-data cases that are publicly released,
but this perspective also emphasizes the use of meso- or macro-level data, publicly
released or not. In this case, the intruder uses the attributes of a small area (a census
tract, for example) to identify the fact that there are individuals in that area who
have certain characteristics (an ethnicity, for example), thereby making it
worthwhile to target them for repression or other harm. The salient recent example
is the use of small area data from the U.S. Census of Population for 2000 to identify
areas with large proportions of Arab-Americans after the events of September 11,
2001 (Clemetson 2004; El-Badry and Swanson 2007).
Later we will outline many of the best-known and most widely practiced methods
for limiting disclosure risk. There is a growing literature on this topic, in part because
both researchers and the statistical agencies of the U.S. government are deeply
concerned about the tension between disclosure of public data and protection of
confidentiality.3 The most important element as we begin this discussion is to
understand that virtually all widely-used disclosure limitation practices reduce the
amount of detail as well as the quality of the information available to the data user.
Many of those information reduction activities—for example removing the name of
the respondent—have little impact on the analytic value of the data, while others—
3 The Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget
sponsors the Confidentiality and Data Access Committee, which coordinates disclosure management
issues for the U.S. government. Its informative web site is at http://www.fcsm.gov/cdac/. This committee
is responsible for the Checklist on Disclosure Potential of Proposed Data Releases (http://www.fcsm.gov/
committees/cdac/checklist_799.doc), which is widely used by agencies and researchers as a starting point
for disclosure review and disclosure limitation.
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for example reducing the number of locations or occupational categories preserved in
the data in order to eliminate ones that might lead to identification—may reduce the
data’s analytic value. These procedures all assume that most data are being used for
research, and that they can be restricted to use for research and not for other harmful
purposes, because restricting those other potential uses requires an entirely different
approach, rooted in government policy and public (rather than research) ethics.
The question that we need to focus on here, then, is how we can maximize
analytic value while minimizing the risk of disclosure, and to do so for the special
case of spatial information linked to social science data. This is a topic that has not
been explored in depth until recently, although there have been two important
publications in recent years (VanWey et al. 2005; National Research Council 2007).
This article takes a different perspective than either of those, based around the issues
faced by data archivists and data users. To make the issue yet more difficult, we
need to consider the extent to which it is possible to preserve the concept of public
use data (those that are publicly available with little or no restriction on use) while
maintaining their research utility. In doing so, we need to think about all the parties
to the research enterprise, including data producers, data users, and the respondents
whose information we value so highly.
The Data Archivist’s Nightmare
The widespread interest in gathering, using, and analyzing spatially explicit
information along with social survey data has produced a new nightmare for those
of us in the business of preserving and disseminating data. The nightmare stems
from a mix of our traditional assumptions about the way that we should do our job
and the rapidly changing world of data. We ordinarily assume that with the careful
exclusion of direct identifiers (name, address, phone number, social security
number), as well as the most common sources of indirect identification (rare
occupations or rare places of birth, or rare combinations of these or other variables,
for example) from any data that we make public, respondent privacy and
confidentiality will be preserved. New technology and the use of spatially explicit
data by researchers call these strategies into question.
Our nightmare involves a data producer who deposits data at ICPSR or some
other public data repository, and whose data after review are free of all obvious
direct and indirect identifiers. As is the case for other data archives and data
producers—such as the Census Bureau—who make microdata available, our
practice is to provide these data to our community of data users with very limited
restrictions. In the case of ICPSR, most such data sets are available for download
after the data user agrees electronically to ICPSR’s Responsible Use Statement.4
4 ICPSR’s Responsible Use Statement is located at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/org/policies/respuse.html
. The data user agrees to these provisions relating to confidentiality: ‘‘(1) To use these datasets solely for
statistical analysis and reporting of aggregated information, and not for investigation of specific indi-
viduals or organizations, except when identification is authorized in writing by ICPSR; (2) To make no
use of the identity of any person or establishment discovered inadvertently, and to advise ICPSR of any
such discovery; (3) To produce no links among ICPSR datasets or among ICPSR data and other datasets
that could identify individuals or organizations.’’
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This is all fine, but the nightmare risk comes in the case that the researcher who
collected the data reveals other information about respondents, especially when those
data are revealed spatially. Even quite simple information linked to spatially explicit
identifiers can be dangerous, for example a map that is part of a presentation,
publication, or web site. A potential intruder may be able to derive an address (or
address range) from a published or presented map, use the address to narrow the
potential group of households that might include the respondent, and then use other
information in the map or presentation to link to the public access data.
Figure 1 represents hypothetical mapped data for Washtenaw County, Michigan.
Initially, it might just be a map of points representing the residences of respondents
to a hypothetical survey.5 This particular map—which we might imagine appearing
in a researcher’s presentation, publication, or web site—tells us that at one location
we know that the respondent is a male African American, aged over 50, who works
within five miles of his residence. Those are straightforward characteristics, and on
their own they are unlikely to carry a substantial disclosure risk in most parts of the
U.S. What would be frightening for everyone involved would be if someone
matched this location to a street address map and pinpointed this respondent to a
single house or more likely (given the scale) to a residential block. That makes the
risk of disclosure much greater, because even these generic characteristics might
lead to identification if the universe from which we choose is so small. If the
intruder goes one step further and finds this case in the public data file, the risk
Fig. 1 Hypothetical map of Washtenaw County, Michigan, revealing the characteristics of a single
respondent, with the location of that respondent’s home
5 It is important to note that addresses are never available for U.S. census data, and could never be
mapped in this way. This is not necessarily the case for other data sources, however, where members of
the data production team might have access to addresses and believe that mapping them would be useful.
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becomes much greater. Not only are there many more attributes in the public data
file that might make it possible to identify the survey respondent, but there may be
responses to other, more sensitive questions in the public data file. The data
producer may be willing to take a chance that an intruder can identify an individual
and know that he is male, black, 50 and over, and works within five miles of his
residence, but questions about income or personal behavior may reveal something
that the respondent did not want others to know. This could seriously compromise
not only the study in question, but the whole process by which social scientists
convince their research subjects to reveal information (Singer et al. 1993).
This nightmare exists because researchers have changed their approach to
managing, collecting, and analyzing data, and they have done so for the good reason
that they can answer important questions by doing so (Rindfuss 2002). Researchers
wish to make use of information such as location in their analysis; this by design has
an increased risk of disclosure. Most of the data collected are not new: data
producers have always had to know the identity of their respondents, including
name, address, telephone number, or school, and possibly their social security or
driver’s license number, the location of their employment, or the places where they
own agricultural or other property. Until the change that we document here, few
data producers had the means to release spatially explicit information (for example
through maps), and extremely few potential intruders had the technical expertise to
use what information was released to identify survey respondents. Moreover, until
fairly recently data producers and secondary data users were content to operate
within a system that tried to ensure that data subject to long-term preservation and
used for secondary analysis had all direct identifiers removed, including locations as
well as name, address, telephone, and social security number.
There is a good reason why researchers wish to make use of spatial data: it has
the potential to produce answers to important questions. Among the earliest known
models for this kind of productive research is John Snow’s famous study of the
London Cholera epidemic of 1854 (see Fig. 2), where he mapped the prevalence of
disease and the proximity of disease to the pumps that London’s population used to
obtain drinking water (Snow 1855; Tufte 2001).6 The pump closest to the most
cholera cases was the likely source of the disease. The value of the cartographic
analysis is in direct proportion to the precision with which the researcher knows the
location of the disease outbreak. Yet that precision also has the potential to reveal
information about the individuals or households whose attributes are included in the
map. The growing use of spatially explicit information derives not only from
advances in social science theory, but in technological changes, including the
increased availability and usability of Geographical Information Systems, and the
increased reliance on hierarchical and multi-level statistical models that often call
for information about spatial location in order to insert the individual or household
in its appropriate context, for example a block, census tract, or city (Armstrong
2002; Goss 1995; Armstrong and Ruggles 2005; Boulos et al. 2006; Brownstein
et al. 2006).
6 For an excellent summary of Snow’s work and its impact, see this web site maintained by the UCLA
School of Public Health: http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow.html.
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Much is new in spatial social science research, despite its antecedents. Since the
1990s (if not earlier), social scientists have been gathering information as part of
their surveys that is spatially explicit and integral to the analytic core of their
research. Researchers who study the relationship between population, land use, and
environment have asked respondents about the location of their agricultural plots,
and then surveyed those plots and recorded their location. They have also linked
those locations to remotely-sensed satellite and aerial photo data.7 These data give
their research an unequalled spatial richness that is resonant with that of the
classical works of epidemiology, and has similar potential to answer important
research questions.
The tension revealed by the data archivist’s nightmare is a conflict between two
concepts. On the one hand, disclosure limitation procedures are designed to
eliminate those attributes or combinations of attributes that make any respondent
unique. We work to eliminate uniqueness. On the other hand, as in the case of
Snow’s map, the locations in spatial data are unique by definition, and their value
comes from their uniqueness. In this case, we work to preserve uniqueness. This
conflict can also partly be revealed as reflecting the interests of the parties whose
interests are at play in terms of spatial data and disclosure.
Competing Needs in the World of Data
The data world is populated by individuals and groups who have competing needs
and goals. In the simplest way (Fig. 3), we can represent three classes of individuals
with a professional interest in data (data producers, data archivists, and data users),
as well as the survey respondent, who is a crucial participant but not professionally
involved. Each of these parties has its own view of the world of data dissemination,
with its own needs and sources of anxiety. Data producers are involved in the
process of data production because they see a need to answer important research
questions; that need is primary. At the same time, they are increasingly pressured—















Fig. 3 A simple model of actors and actions in the public data world
7 Some of this work is well summarized in two National Academy Publications (Liverman et al. 1998;
Entwisle and Stern 2005), and especially in Moran and Brondizio (1998) and Entwisle et al. (1998).
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others. They also sometimes face with ambivalence the conflict between a goal of
maintaining complete control over their data and an alternative approach that hands
the data over to the data archive’s specialists in the preservation and dissemination
of data. Data users are not a totally separate group, because they overlap in many
cases with data producers. Data users, on the other hand, need access to data that can
serve their research questions without being subject either to restraints on access to
data or to limits on the analytic utility of the data. Survey respondents have been
brought into the research process because information about them has value for
important societal questions. Researchers promise them confidentiality and
preservation from unnecessary risk of harm in order to secure their consent to
participate (Singer 1993, 1978; Singer et al. 1992, 1995). These promises must be
kept, ensuring the long-term protection from harm of survey respondents. The data
archivist attempts to serve all the needs just listed, and more. We are responsible for
helping the data producer preserve and share his or her data, for helping the data
user get relatively easy access to data that will answer the research questions that
they have identified, and for constantly being on the watch to preserve the
confidentiality promises given to the survey respondent.
Meeting all these needs by and for all the parties to the research process has
become a constantly moving target and an ever more complicated process,
especially over the past decade. At the very heart of the problem is the increasing
quantity of information about individuals that is available to the public, or available
with relatively little difficulty and at relatively low cost (Sweeney 2001). On-line
telephone directories are the simplest of these publicly available and searchable
databases. Others are more restricted, but they have much more information, such as
proprietary (but still widely available) marketing and credit databases (such as
Experian—http://www.experian.com), and other more public sources, such as the
Aristotle database (http://www.aristotle.com) that is largely built from voter regis-
tration data, are available to anyone who is willing to pay a fee. One only has to
spend a short time searching the web to know that there is a great deal of infor-
mation readily available.8 The danger of public release of information is made more
complicated by the rapid increase in computing power available to all, which means
that efforts at data matching and data mining that would have been unattainable to
most intruders a few years ago are no longer outside the realm of possibility. Spatial
data add to this problem by making it easier for the intruder to refine the search
based on geographical constraints.
At the same time that it has become easier for the intruder, the public—and
public officials—have become more sensitive to the risk of disclosure (Robbin
2001).9 This sensitivity has increased the resistance of potential respondents to
participation in surveys. Throughout the U.S. the public discussion of identity theft
8 Searching any of the commonly used online directories (whitepages.com, netscape.com, etc.) for a
name yields a link to a service that will do a background check on that individual, as well as perform
other kinds of searches, all for a moderate fee. For an example, see http://www.publicdata.com/.
9 On March 1, 2005, the U.S. Census Bureau named Gerald W. Gates its first ‘‘Privacy Officer.’’ The
Bureau’s concern about public perceptions and their impact on doing its job is evident in the web page
entitled ‘‘Are you in a survey,’’ which is part of the Bureau’s Data Protection and Privacy Policy web
page: http://www.census.gov/privacy.
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has grown in volume and frequency, leading to increasing caution about the sharing
of information.10 The general discourse about these issues has been heightened by a
number of legislative initiatives.11 There have been a steady stream of efforts since
the 1970s to protect privacy (the Privacy Act of 1974), keep student and other public
records from being disclosed (the Federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act of 1974), and culminating recently with the extensive requirements of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (PL 104-191),
otherwise known as HIPAA, and the Confidential Information Protection and
Statistical Efficiency Act of 2002 (CIPSEA).12 While it is important to emphasize
that the most damaging public releases of information have come from intrusions
into confidential administrative databases held by universities, government agen-
cies, and private businesses, and not from statistical or research data, the discussion
has led to heightened public anxiety about all forms of data collection and data
maintenance.13
This is where the intruder, the last party to our public data world, enters the
picture (Fig. 4). By adding the intruder to our picture, we see that in many ways the
data files become the central element in our conceptualization, with a variety of
actors surrounding them. Each of these actors—the human subject, the various
research interests, and the intruder—have their own goals with regard to the data
and their own relationship with the other parties. And each is constrained differently
by legal and regulatory constraints, no more so than the actors who are committed to
conducting and facilitating research.
The identity of intruders into social science data remains a mystery to us, which
is probably a good thing because it means that there have not yet been enough
intrusions into these research data to warrant serious study. It is likely—but not at
all certain—that such intruders are different from the criminals who are known to
exploit commercial databases in order to commit identity theft. We presume that
one category of intruders are those who know someone is involved in a study,
perhaps an angry spouse or a curious parent who feels that they have sufficient
reason to tackle data in order to discover important information. We presume that
another category of intruder is a ‘‘hacker’’—someone who has an interest in
understanding technology and a grudge against the system—who attacks a data
source merely because he can and because he enjoys disruption. There is limited
evidence about the existence of both of these categories of intruders, but it is limited
10 There are a large number of discussions of identity theft in the news media and on public agency web
sites, as well as special-purpose organizations that purport to work to thwart identity theft, but the
quantity of serious academic and legal discussion of the problem thus far is quite limited.
11 The University of California Libraries have a good web site on Privacy legislation and issues at
http://libraries.universityofcalifornia.edu/privacy/legis.html#federal.
12 The Privacy Act of 1974 (PL 93-579-5 U.S.C. 552a); the Federal Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), dated July 17, 1976 (20 U.S.C. Section 1232g-34 CFR Part 99); and the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (PL 104-191); Confidential Information
Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act of 2002 (PL 107-347-44 USC 3501).
13 In February and March, 2005, the major story has been the unintentional sale of data by the data
brokers ChoicePoint and Lexis-Nexis to criminals who apparently used the information for identity theft.
See, for example the multitude of stories in the New York Times, or Bruce Schneier’s weblog:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/choicepoint.html.
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for good reason: data producers and repositories rarely disclose any evidence they
might have of intrusions or intruders, or even whether such intrusions have taken
place. Our limited knowledge about intrusions means that we can only speculate
about intruders, their practices, and their motives.
Disclosure Limitation Basics
The body of literature on disclosure limitation methodology dates to the 1970s and
has become quite large.14 The field emerged in the late 1960s as computer scientists
discovered new efficient means to link administrative records (Fellegi 1972). In
1976, the Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology (FCSM) formed a
subcommittee to investigate ways to release statistically useful information without
subjecting respondents to confidentiality risks. In 1978, the committee issued its first
report, ‘‘Statistical Policy Working Paper 2: Report on Statistical Disclosure and
Disclosure Avoidance Techniques’’ (Subcommittee on Disclosure-Avoidance
Techniques 1978). Working Paper 2 set forth a framework for defining statistical
disclosure and summarized the techniques available for limiting disclosure risk in
data products. Although updated during the past quarter-century (Subcommittee on
Disclosure Limitation Methodology 1994), these techniques continue to be used as
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Fig. 4 A more complex model of actors and actions in the public data world
14 Duncan (2001) provides a brief and effective overview, with a bibliography. For a fuller (but
obviously not complete) bibliography on the topic, see O’Rourke and Gutmann (2005), on-line at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/HSP/citations/index.html.
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The principles laid out in Working paper 2 and in important subsequent work by
many authors include: (1) Releasing samples from larger populations; (2) Reducing
variability of categorical data where the attributes facilitate identification of specific
sub-populations in the data; (3) Suppressing data that render unique cases visible;
and (4) Stochastically perturbing individual values in a manner that retains the
original covariate structure. In technical terms disclosure limitation involves
manipulating or masking a data matrix. Following important work by Cox (1980),
Dalenius and Reiss (1982), Roberts (1986), Dalenius (1986), and Duncan and
Lambert (1986), Duncan and Pearson (1991) provide a clear and accessible
description of the methods available for the reduction of disclosure risk. More
recent monographic treatments by Willenborg and de Waal (1996, 2001) and Doyle
et al. (2001) update the framework to emphasize disclosure risk assessment and
administrative alternatives to statistical solutions.
In this section we provide an overview of disclosure limitation and attempt to
establish some ground-rules for understanding how disclosure risk can be
minimized and what such minimized disclosure risk means for subsequent analysis.
Here, we are concentrating on disclosure limitation in situations where spatial data
are not explicitly in play.
Our goal in limiting disclosure risk is to minimize the visibility of unique
respondents. The simplest and most dangerous case of a unique occurs when an
individual in a survey has a combination of characteristics that would make him or
her unique in the general population, thus making the respondent easily identifiable.
Consider an individual who has a unique occupation within a large geographic area,
such as the single member of the U.S. House of Representatives within some states.
Somewhat less dangerous occurrences arise when a respondent has unique
characteristics within the survey (but not necessarily in the general public), and
when there are attributes of the survey design that make it possible to identify that
individual. An example of this kind of unique would be a study with a highly
clustered design (for example, schools), where it was possible to find out about the
sampling frame. It would not be a surprise, for example, that students, parents,
teachers, and staff, not to mention other members of the community, had learned
that a given school was a primary sampling unit for a school-based survey. Highly
clustered sample designs pose serious disclosure risks, both because they provide so
many opportunities for there to be unique cases, and because so many individuals
are likely to know of the study’s existence. Most forms of explicit spatial data also
pose serious disclosure risks.
We limit disclosure risk first by eliminating all obvious identifiers, whether they
be direct or indirect. A direct identifier is an attribute like a name, social security
number, telephone number, and so on. Indirect identifiers are attributes which are
not necessarily exclusive to the individual in question, but can be used in
combination with other measures to unambiguously identify. For instance, in a
demographic dataset, the date of birth and date of death taken together with county
of residence can work as indirect identification mechanisms. After addressing
obvious identifiers, we focus on other cases that have unique combinations of key
attributes. Data from these cases can be modified or transformed in a number of
ways to confuse potential intruders.
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We explain this in more detail later, but the key is to change the data matrix (by
adding, subtracting, or modifying cases) in order to prevent the intruder from
knowing with certainty if re-identification occurred.15 What may be most important
in thinking about disclosure limitation is that the data producer consider these issues
as close to the beginning of the project as possible. A dissemination strategy is not
sufficient if it only consists of a statement to the sponsors of the research that says
that the investigator will share the data. Rather, it is essential that the investigators
plan for dissemination from the very start of their research, and possibly even
earlier. Many things can go wrong if not planned for early. Early planning helps
everyone involved in the process make good decisions about the ultimate
dissemination of a data collection and helps prevent inadvertent mistakes that can
complicate dissemination. The publication of maps with individual cases shown is
one of them. Appropriate informed consent procedures and discussions with local
Institutional Review Boards for human subjects are another. Moreover, it is not
good practice to announce to the public or the research community the location of
research sites that can be thought of as primary sampling units, despite how grateful
we are that a school, hospital, location, or other site has agreed to participate. That
information alone is enough to compromise a data sharing plan for a project, and
limit our ability to share the data in the future.
Conceptually, in order to understand how to think about disclosure risk and
disclosure limitation, we should see the data in a set of survey responses as an n-by-
p matrix (Fig. 5). Each of the n-rows provides information on i subjects for p
attributes. The rows represent records for individual respondents, while the columns
represent the values provided by the respondent to each question. Key attributes are
those that when combined can identify a respondent, even when identification
requires information coming from other, external sources. Disclosure risk is reduced
by eliminating unique sets of key attributes, and by adding noise to data elements
(Kim 1986; Kim and Winkler 2003). We accomplish this by changing either
records, or attributes, or both.
Records can be changed by making public only a sample of the original cases, so
intruders cannot be sure that someone they know in the sample is actually
represented by the record identified (Fig. 6a). An example is a parent of a child
enumerated in a school-based study. The parent knows that the child is in the overall






Fig. 5 Disclosure limitation
techniques: matrix masking of
non-spatial data. Consider the
dataset X to be an n-by-p matrix.
Each of the n-rows provides
information on i subjects for p
attributes
15 For example, the public use files from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add
health) that are distributed by the Sociometrics Corporation (www.socio.com) only contain a randomly
chosen one-in-two sample of the original cases.
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identified the correct respondent in the sub-sample because some cases have been
eliminated. Alternatively, we can add synthetically generated records to multiply
the number of cases that share key attributes, eliminating uniques. In this case we
create a situation where every unique in the original sample was represented by two
or more cases, making it impossible to know which one of them is actually the case
the intruder has in mind. A third alternative for record changing is to displace
records spatially (Fig. 6d). In this transformation, we swap records from one place
to another, so that information from an individual with a certain set of key attributes
is exchanged with the information from another individual, located in a different
geographical area, but who matches the same attributes. (Dalenius and Reiss 1982;
Fienberg and McIntyre 2004; Takemura 2002; Zayatz 2003). In this case, the
intruder believes that he has identified an individual he knows, but attributes that are
not shared between the two cases are not necessarily the same. They may have the
same age, sex, race, occupation, and marital status, but their response on income,
attitudes, or other behaviors may be different. The intruder believes that he has
A. Releasing only a sample of the data (subtracting rows from X) 
 del del del del 
  n2 p1  n2 p3
    X sampled =
  n4 p1  … … n4 p4
B. Dropping sensitive variables from the file (subtracting columns from X) 
 n2 p1 … … del 
  del 
    X -sp =  del
  n4 p1  … … del 
C. Altering sensitive cells through recoding, collapsing, top or bottom coding,  
    or adding stochastic error (perturbing X) 
 n2 p1 … … del 
 n2 p3’
    X perturbed =         n3 p2’
  n4 p1  … … n4 p4
D. Swapping or relocating attributes from one record to another 
 del del del del 
  n4 p1 n4p2 n4p3 n4 p4
    X swapped =
  n2 p1 n2p2   n2 p3 n2p4
Fig. 6 Disclosure limitation techniques: matrix masking of non-spatial data. Four specific approaches
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identified a case, but he is mistaken in the information that he draws from the
process.
Transforming attributes is a different process, although it shares characteristics
with record-changing procedures, specifically with record swapping. In general,
attribute transformations require us to change the values of one or more of the
attributes of an individual case in the study in order to reduce the likelihood of their
being identified by values in the data. The simplest way to do this, although it can
represent a substantial reduction in the analytic value of the data, is to eliminate
sensitive variables completely (Fig. 6b). Tail-censoring (of which top-coding is a
special case) is another category of attribute transformation, where rare values in the
tail of a distribution are grouped together so that none of them exceeds a certain
range, for example recoding incomes over a certain amount so that all those
individuals have as their income the cut-off (say by recoding all incomes over
$100,000 to ‘‘$100,000 or more’’). Tail-censoring or top-coding is a special case of
all forms of perturbation, including recoding, collapsing, bottom coding, and adding
stochastic error (Fig. 6c). Some of the other widely-used approaches are micro-
aggregation, where individual values are clustered into small aggregates of size k,
and then replaced with the average value from the aggregate (Domingo-Ferrer and
Mateo-Sanz 2002; Domingo-Ferrer et al. 2002; Sande 2002), and the post-
randomization method (PRAM), where scores from categorical variables are
changed to a different score prescribed by a probability mechanism.
The best efforts at disclosure limitation make use of a wide range of expertise,
drawn not only from the producers of the data, but also data users, statisticians, and
experts on data dissemination and disclosure (O’Rourke 2003). When done
effectively, it retains statistically useful variables and does not change the statistical
properties of the data. In reality, changes to the statistical properties may be
inevitable, and at the very least these changes may not always be fully understood in
advance (Little 1993; Domingo-Ferrer and Torra 2001; Armstrong et al. 1999). A
further limitation is that many disclosure limitation procedures have a dispropor-
tionate impact on the analysis of small sub-populations that may be of high research
interest, for example racial minorities, pregnant women, and people with rare health
problems. Because these individuals are infrequent in the population, they may
require more data transformations to prevent disclosure, thereby further complicat-
ing statistical analysis.
As a practical matter, researchers and data archivists have learned that they
cannot always limit disclosure risk enough so that data may be made available to the
general public, even under data use limitations like those imposed by ICPSR.
Instead, the most effective practitioners of data sharing for sensitive data have
developed schemes whereby they categorize data into as many as four or five
categories, depending on the sensitivity of the data and the risk of disclosure after
masking procedures have been completed.16 Low risk data can be shared widely. In
the case of sensitive data or data with higher disclosure risk, restricted use
16 See, for example, the restricted data protections for the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey
(L.A. FANS) at http://www.lasurvey.rand.org/data/restricted; the National Longitudinal Adolescent
Health Survey (Add Health) at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/data; and the Health and
Retirement Survey (HRS) at http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/rda/reslis2.php.
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dissemination may be more desirable. An example would be when the data user
(and his or her employer) is required to implement data protection technology and
sign a contract ensuring the promise of non-disclosure. In the most sensitive cases,
these data may only be made available in a data enclave, like those at major data
centers like the Carolina Population Center, ICPSR, the Institute for Social Research
at the University of Michigan, the National Center for Health Statistics’ Research
Data Center, and the network of Census Research Data Centers maintained by the
U.S. Bureau of the Census.17 These more restrictive solutions—especially those
involving enclave protection—are an important solution but a last resort for all
concerned because they severely restrict access to data for many potential data users
who have difficulty relocating to the site of the enclave.
Recent research has also led to insights into an alternative to restrictive solutions,
in the form of synthetic data (Little 1993; Rubin 1993; Raghunathan et al. 2003;
Abowd and Lane 2004; Reiter 2002, 2005). Conceptually, synthetic data can be
created by modeling the attributes of a given research data set, and then using those
modeled attributes to create a synthetic population with the same statistical
characteristics. Because the cases in the data file are all created by the
‘‘synthesizer,’’ they can be publicly disseminated without any disclosure risk at
all: all of them are made up in the modeling process, and none of them are actual
human research subjects. Rubin (1993) argues that datasets generated through
multiple imputation procedures can actually provide more useful information to an
analyst than ‘‘real’’ data coarsened through more traditional disclosure techniques.
While it is not yet clear to what extent synthetic data will be useful for all research
questions, they constitute an important starting point for thinking about ways of
making data public while still preserving the confidentiality and privacy of survey
respondents.
Disclosure Limitation and Spatial Data
Spatial data add a wealth of opportunities for social science research, while
simultaneously adding disclosure risk because of their very precision. In this
discussion we do not attempt to differentiate between the growing variety of forms
of spatial data that are available or may be available. Some of these data are as
simple as the exact address or latitude and longitude of a house, school, medical
facility, or place of work, obtained during survey data collection. Other forms of
spatial data come from various kinds of remotely-sensed sources, including aerial
photographs, satellite imagery, and the output from devices that help ascertain and
record an individual’s location, such as a cell phone or the toll-paying tags now used
in many localities. From our point of view the source of information is less relevant
than the fact that one or more precise locations can be associated with data of use to
social science researchers.
17 For the NCHS Research Data Center, see http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/r&d/rdc.htm. For the Census
Research Data Center program and centers (there are currently 9, with a 10th opening soon) see
http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/ces/researchprogram.
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We begin our discussion of ways to deal with spatially explicit data by
emphasizing that most mechanisms for limiting disclosure in data where locational
precision is not required involve collapsing geographical categories. The widely-
used Public-Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) produced by the U.S. Bureau of the
census for the 2000 enumeration of the United States are a case in point (U.S.
Bureau of the Census 2003).18 In these data, for example, no area with a population
smaller than 100,000 persons is identified in the 5% sample, and none with a
population smaller than 400,000 is identified in the 1% sample.19 By collapsing
geography to these categories, and then by invoking a series of other disclosure-
reduction measures, the Census Bureau ensures that there are no unique individuals
in any of the geographic areas it reports.20 The PUMS, of course, is drawn from
what is already a very large sample, consisting of approximately 15.8% of U.S.
residents, those who completed the long form of the census questionnaire. Smaller
samples can require more substantial collapsing of geographical units, and might
report geography at a larger scale, for example the state or region, or in some
instances, without any geographical precision at all, besides reporting that all of the
respondents live within the United States.
Aggregating geography has the desirable effect of easily reducing disclosure risk,
but it does so at great cost, because it limits the precision with which we know
where people live, or work, or transact other activities in their lives. We see in
Figs. 7 and 8 the dramatic impact of reducing spatial precision, here by collapsing
our imagined Washtenaw county population (divided into Black and a non-Black
respondents) to the scale of census tracts. Figure 8 is interesting, but it can’t give us
the detail shown in Fig. 7, and if we were to collapse even more thoroughly—to the
city, county, or state—we would have a very different kind of geographical
information, with much less precision. Spatial precision, as we learned from John
Snow’s work, can have important analytic value. The key to defining best practices
for public use of spatially explicit data will be to find the most effective compromise
between masking data by aggregating geography so that data can be made public,
and restricting data so that the maximum analytic value can be preserved. We need
to keep as much information as possible while protecting respondents from breach
of confidentiality, at the same time not losing sight of the special characteristics of
spatial information: it is useful because it is precise.
When we turn to strategies for diminishing disclosure risk for spatially explicit
data, we find ourselves with three major alternatives, each designed to reduce the
level of risk while maintaining as much analytic utility as possible (Armstrong et al.
1999). We can summarize these approaches as ones that adjust the coordinates, ones
that aggregate points, and ones that attach contextual data prior to dissemination.
18 The areas of 100,000 or more in the PUMS are called Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs), and the
areas of 400,000 are called super-PUMAs. The full range of disclosure avoidance techniques used by the
Census Bureau are described in the PUMS Technical Documentation (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2003),
and in Hawala (2003). For the debate that led to these classifications, see Robbin (2001).
19 The 100,000 rule is embedded in the FCSM Checklist (Interagency Confidentiality and Data Access
Group, Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology 1999).
20 Zayatz (2002); Zayatz et al. (1996). For other U.S. agencies, see Jabine (1993). For the more general
question, see Duncan et al. (1993).
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All of these can be successful at masking the identity of respondents, and all do so
by reducing some of the potential data use or analysis that can be done. The problem
posed by spatial data makes these solutions both necessary and obvious. When we
attach specific geographic coordinates to social survey data, we provide those with
access to the data with an absolute means to recognize the location at which the
Fig. 8 Data about hypothetical respondents to survey, aggregated to census tract
Fig. 7 Highly detailed data about hypothetical respondents to a survey
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activity (living, working) takes place. Only by changing those coordinates in some
way can we limit disclosure, but by changing or masking those coordinates we
reduce their precision. The key is to make those changes while still retaining as
much of the core information represented by the coordinates as possible.
Adjusting Coordinates
The simplest way to minimize the risk of disclosure in the case of data with exact
spatial coordinates is to displace those coordinates in some way. The risk in doing
so, of course, is that displacement may distort the spatial information that makes the
data valuable in the first place. Among the techniques used to adjust coordinates, the
first and most straightforward is to displace points, either by shifting them with a
fixed or random increment. We can, for example, add or subtract a fixed or random
amount to both the x-axis and the y-axis. Other alternatives that fall in the same
family of procedures are to change the scale that represents the relationship between
points, to rotate them, or to use some combination of displacement, scale change,
and rotation.21 Adjusting coordinates in a systematic way may preserve internal
spatial relationships, so that a study designed to measure the distances family
members travel to assist each other may maintain those distances, but the more
systematic the adjustment, the more likely that an intruder can reverse the process
and decode the original locations. Combining adjustment procedures makes it easier
to mask location, but at the same time makes analysis more difficult. It may also be
necessary to individualize data sets with adjusted coordinates, each designed to
optimize analytic capacity for a given research application while minimizing the
risk of disclosure. Yet creating a multitude of individualized data sets based on a
single original study increases the risk of confusion among data users and makes it
possible—at least in theory—for an intruder to combine customized but public data
sets and reverse-engineer the masking used in them.
Aggregation
An alternative to adjusting coordinates is to aggregate points. At its simplest,
aggregation is exactly what researchers have always done to mask location and
minimize the possibility of disclosure. Instead of representing the exact location, we
collect and summarize values for an administrative unit, such as a census tract,
county, city, state, or even country. There are also more sophisticated ways of doing
this, which are fundamentally similar to other kinds of micro-aggregation. If we
believe that the distance between relatively close-by points is not essential to the
analysis, we can take a fixed or varying number of nearby points and give them the
same location, either that of one of the points, or some synthesized location (for
example the centroid of the polygon implied by the original points). This has the
potential to maintain certain information for analysis at a scale less than that of an
21 It is usually not possible to perform these adjustments automatically, because it is often necessary to
ensure that the adjusted coordinates do not conflict with physical realities, for example by putting a house
in a lake, or a road that mounts straight up a hill or mountain.
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arbitrary administrative unit, while still masking exact locations. It is less useful if
the exact spatial relationship of one location to the others is essential to the analysis.
Attaching Contextual Variables
Sometimes the only reason that researchers require spatial information is in order to
be able to attach contextual variables. We want to know, for example, the
characteristics of the population (or some other set of attributes) of the
administrative unit in which the individual lives, rather than the exact location of
that residence or the distance from that residence to place of work or health care. By
providing the data user with the exact location of the respondent’s home we give
that data user the flexibility to merge individual-level data with whatever contextual
data are most appropriate. At the same time, this strategy raises the risk of
disclosure. The alternative is for the data producer to attach a set of contextual
variables to the individual-level data, while removing the precise location from the
data set.22 This has the advantage of preserving confidentiality while giving the data
user a range of contextual variables with which to enrich his or her analysis. On the
other hand, it reduces the data user’s flexibility, because she or he is dependent on
the contextual variable choices of the producer. And unless done carefully, it does
not necessarily eliminate disclosure risk. Depending on sample design and the
contextual variables attached, the contextual variables themselves may constitute a
unique geographic definition, and allow an intruder to identify the location of the
contextual unit, for example a census tract or county. It is easy to imagine that a
combination of population size broken down by sex and race might uniquely
identify an area the size of a census tract, at least within a known state or census
region. If it were possible to match a respondent to an area that small, the task of
identification based on other attributes would be much easier. The same is true if the
respondent were identified by area code and telephone exchange, especially given
the newly published demographic data available at that resolution, as well as at the
resolution of the nine-digit zip code.23
This discussion of spatial data and the means that might be used to mask location
produces a few key findings. The first is that it is possible to preserve spatial
relationships within data while reducing disclosure risk, but the task is not an easy
one. Either we reduce the analytic value of the data or we increase the risk of
disclosure. If the attributes of interest can be preserved by aggregating locations,
either through ordinary aggregation or micro-aggregation, or by adding contextual
variables and eliminating the precise locations, the task is much simpler—again at
the expense of losing spatial precision. Whatever approach we take, Armstrong and
his colleagues have shown that different approaches allow different kinds of spatial
analysis, implying the creation of more than one public-use data set to represent a
single original study. That may be satisfactory, but there is an unmeasured risk
22 This is the practice of the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), for example.
23 These data are available from Geolytics, Inc., a producer of high quality and widely used demographic
products. The risk posed by these products with demographic attributes and differing geographies, when
coupled with other attributes, is well-described in Steel and Sperling (2001).
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created by putting multiple data sets in the public domain, because it may be
possible to combine them and reverse-engineer the masking in order to discover the
original locations. Spatial data are also prime candidates for restricted-use data
agreements and enclave protections, with the same warning that all such restrictions
sharply diminish the availability of research data to many potential users and
thereby limit the return on investment. Synthetic data are an enticing prospect for
spatial data, but relatively little work has been done in this area, and the value of
synthesizing data with specific spatial attributes is still unknown.
Challenges for the Actors
Early in this paper we identified a group of actors whose roles are important in
understanding disclosure risk. Before we turn to best practices and recommenda-
tions it is worthwhile returning to them and their concerns, and to highlight the
challenges each faces, especially in the situation where spatially explicit data have
been created and have the potential to be shared with other researchers.
Data producers need to be applauded for their determination and creativity in
coming up with ways to collect and analyze data with so much more valuable
information than has been previously available. Spatial data are a wonderful tool
that enhances research possibilities for everyone. At the same time, data producers
need to understand from the very beginning of the research process that there are
risks associated with sharing their data, and they need to work with determination to
overcome those risks without giving up and without falling back on needlessly
restrictive practices that make data sharing difficult for the rest of the community.
They need to embrace and support innovative work in the area of data
transformation and synthetic data creation if those new ideas will lead to wider
use of their data. Similarly, they need to form partnerships with the data archiving
and preservation community to ensure that they are aware of the most up-to-date
techniques for ensuring that their data are preserved and made available for others.
Their other close partners are survey respondents, who need to be protected in a
rapidly changing world, but who also are required to take seriously the informed
consent that they give.
Secondary data users need to be aware of the risks of disclosure and the
obligations that data producers and data archivists have taken on in the area of
respondent protection. They need to understand that spatially explicit data and data
with other kinds of highly clustered sample designs pose special disclosure risks that
require special protection and treatment. Their challenge is to find ways to work with
data that have in some cases been transformed in ways that make them less useful for
secondary analysis than they were to the primary analyst, or that have restrictions on
use that make them less than optimally accessible. Data users have an obligation to
engage with all the other actors in a constructive way to make sure that as much
research as possible is done, with as little risk of harm to respondents as possible.
We in the archiving community have the challenging role of being in the middle
of all the action, with the responsibility to protect the interests of all the other
parties: producers, users, and respondents. Our challenge is to be pro-active in
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seeking out the best ways to preserve data and make them available, to
communicate these best practices to data producers, and then to document and
explain the resulting decisions to data users. Spatial data make that task more
difficult, because our world is increasingly changing from one where our only
obligation was to distribute totally safe and anonymous data to all who wanted it,
and where we knew how to ensure that safety. We now are part of a world where
opportunities to identify respondents grows daily, and where spatial information
makes that ever easier. Studies that were safe to distribute just two or three years
ago may no longer be safe to distribute without a refreshed disclosure review, or
without restrictions that make it difficult for data users to complete their research.
Best Practices and Recommendations
In addressing this moving target, part of our long-term research project involves a
survey of data producers funded by federal agencies, in which we ask them about
their practices for protecting the confidentiality of respondents. We will use the
results of that survey to continue to develop a list of best practices. We summarize
our discussion by emphasizing four main points.
(1) It is essential that the data producer think about dissemination planning as
early in the research process as possible, and consider questions of disclosure risk at
every stage in the research design. This is especially important in the case of spatial
data because the inadvertent release of certain kinds of spatial information can
diminish the ability to make other forms of data publicly available later.
For example, at the stage at which the investigator is applying for funds, she or he
should inform the potential funder that spatially explicit data are involved, and that
they cannot easily be released as anonymous public data, but may require some
form of restricted data release. These forms of data release may lead to additional
costs, which need to be born by one party or another, either funder, data producer,
data user, or data archive. In addition, it is crucial to reveal to Human Subjects
review boards that location data will be collected or merged with social survey data,
and that data dissemination is planned. It is equally important to include this notice
in the informed consent process. At the same time, it is reasonable to say that the
investigators will not publicly release identities or locations associated with survey
respondents.
At later stages in the process, it is equally important that researchers keep
disclosure risk in mind, especially for spatial data. We have shown the dangers that
follow from the publication of maps that identify individual respondents along with
their responses to individual survey questions. Any disseminated information that
reveals primary sampling units in highly clustered designs makes public release
sensitive, whether that information reveals the primary sampling unit directly (by
giving its name) or indirectly (for example by publishing characteristics of the PSU
that would allow it to be identified).
(2) There exists a large body of well-known practices that mask identities in data
and limit disclosure risk. These practices—briefly introduced and documented in
this paper—constitute the starting point for all assessments of disclosure risk and
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implementations of disclosure limitation strategies. Those who work on data sharing
are well advised to use those procedures as an explicit checklist, starting with the
work of the Subcommittee on Disclosure Avoidance Techniques (1978, 1994),
continuing with the work of Duncan and Pearson (1991), and including the recent
recommendations from Armstrong et al. (1999); Doyle et al. (2001); and Willen-
borg and de Waal (2001). The Checklist on Disclosure Potential of Proposed Data
Releases (Interagency Confidentiality and Data Access Group 1999) is a starting
point for the verification of these processes, which our research on best practices is
designed to complement and enhance. Those procedures that allow public data
dissemination often limit the analytic utility of the data, however, especially for
spatially explicit data.
The simplest example of the loss of analytic utility comes from removing spatial
information from the data file, especially if that removal takes away information that
was crucial to the study design (sample weights) or to the analysis that the original
research team conducted. Eliminating spatial variables used by the initial
investigators in their research may protect respondents, but it does not permit
secondary analysis or replication, which is the goal of data sharing. Effective data
sharing designs need to protect the needs of respondents while understanding the
needs of secondary data users, and not focus exclusively on the needs and desires of
data producers.
(3) One size does not fit all types of data and all types of users. Different data
users sometimes require different types of data, with different attributes from a
disclosure risk perspective. As Armstrong et al. (1999) show, it is possible to share
spatial data in more ways if the data producer is willing to transform the data
differently for different users, for example by performing microaggregation for
some while rotating the locations of points for others. The notion of customizable
distribution of data is an enticing prospect for the future, especially if we find a way
to ensure that multiple versions of the same underlying data do not lead to
potentially risky situations.
(4) The data producer and the data archivist need to be sensitive to the wide
variety of ways that data can be disseminated effectively, not all of which involve
masked public-use data sets. Other options, including restricted-use contracts, the
deposit of data in protective enclaves, and the enticing but not yet fully developed
concept of synthetic data sets are all options. Where precise information on location
is crucial to successful research, these options may be the only ones available.
Following those best practices will go a long way towards preventing our data
disclosure nightmare from ever coming to pass. The nightmare does not require that
someone has made spatial data public, only that whatever spatial information (maps,
for example) is made public be sensitive to ways that it can be used by an intruder to
locate respondents and then link them to non-spatial information that is made
public. Avoiding the nightmare requires a great deal of advance thought on the part
of the data producer about what she or he can publish without risking disclosure of
the identities of respondents, and about the fact that new technologies and systemic
weaknesses in our data systems make protecting the confidentiality a game with
moving targets. It is essential that we be proactive in ensuring as much protection as
possible.
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